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Enforcing U.S. Judgments in Canada:
"Things Are Looking Up!"
Ivan F. Ivankovich*
I. INTRODUCTION
Four years have now elapsed since the landmark decision in
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye,1 a case most recently de-
scribed as "the most important decision on the conflict of laws ever
rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada."2 The domestic impact of
Morguard has been truly profound. It has been used by some courts to
broaden the common law grounds for the recognition and enforce-
ment of Canadian extraprovincial judgments3 and by others to man-
date such recognition via the existence of an implicit "full faith and
credit" doctrine in the Canadian Constitution. The result is that many
more intra-Canadian judgments are being recognized and enforced in
Canada. Taken alone, this would be of limited interest to most Ameri-
can judgment creditors. What is of major interest is the extent to
which Morguard has been used to date to broaden the basis for the
recognition and enforcement of United States judgments and the
prognosis for continued evolution in that direction. 4 Because Canada
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Faculty of Business, University of Alberta.
76 D.L.R.4th 256 (Can. 1990).
2 J. Ziegel, Introduction, Symposium: Recognition of Extraprovincial and Foreign Judg-
ments: The Implications of Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 22 CAN. Bus. W. 1, 2
(1993).
3 The term "Canadian extraprovincial judgment" is used to denote a judgment rendered by
a court of another Canadian province or territory.
4 "Recognition" of a foreign judgment occurs when a court in a Canadian province or terri-
tory deems a particular matter conclusively decided by the foreign court. "Enforcement" occurs
when the local court grants the relief provided by the foreign judgment. Recognition must pre-
cede enforcement because a foreign judgment is not directly enforceable in a Canadian province
or territory without first being reduced to a judgment of a local court. The same distinction
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and the United States are the world's largest trading partners,5 the
importance of this issue cannot be understated.
While Morguard's impact on the rules concerning the recognition
and enforcement of judgments emanating from the courts of sister-
provinces and territories within Canada is undeniable, differences of
opinion about the desirability of applying its broader recognition prin-
ciples to truly "foreign" judgments have emerged.6 Also, owing to spe-
cific statutory provisions in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick,
Morguard's expansion of the common law grounds for recognition has
been held inapplicable in its entirety to all extraprovincial judgments
in those two provinces.7 In addition, owing to Quebec's civil law re-
gime, Morguard's common law developments would not generally be
applicable to the enforcement of international judgments in that prov-
ince.8 The net effect, from the standpoint of American judgment cred-
itors, is a balkanization in which uncertainty abounds.
Part I of this commentary will briefly review the Morguard deci-
sion and the underlying rationale for the Supreme Court of Canada's
dramatic departure from precedent. Part I will analyze Morguard's
judicial aftermath in an effort to ascertain the current likelihood of
enforcing a United States judgment in the common law provinces and
territories of Canada. Part III will discuss how lower courts to date
prevails in the United States. See Behrooz Moghaddam, Recognition of Foreign Country Judg-
ments - A Case for Federalization, 22 TEXAs Ir'r. L.J. 331, 332 (1987).
5 For the year 1992, U.S. exports to Canada were $90,594.3 million and imports from Can-
ada were $98,630.0 million. TnE Wo.LD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACrS, 182 (Robert
Famighetti et al. eds., 1994). For the year 1991, Canadian exports to the U.S. were C$ 103.45
billion and imports from the U.S. were C$86.62 billion. CANADL4,N ALmANAC AND DiRECrORY,
60-95 (Liba Berry et al. eds., 1993).
6 Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "foreign judgment" will be used herein-
after to designate a judgment rendered by a court of a country or unit of a federal country other
than Canada.
7 See discussion, infra, accompanying notes 69-71. The constitutionality of these statutory
formulations insofar as intra-Canadian judgments are concerned is doubtful. While Morguard
was not argued in constitutional terms, the issue was raised directly in Hunt v. T & N plc, 1
W.W.R. 129, 153-55 (Can. 1994). La Forest J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, held that
the minimum standards of order and fairness addressed in Morguard were "constitutional imper-
atives." This determination, however, would not likely effect the recognition and enforcement of
non-Canadian judgments in the two provinces.
8 Although the Supreme Court of Canada recently determined that the Morguard principle
constitutes a rule of Canadian constitutional law, such status would be limited to an intra-Cana-
dian context: See Hunt, supra note 7, at 153-55. For a complete discussion of Quebec's rules for
the recognition and enforcement of international judgments, see James A. Woods, Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments Between Provinces: The Constitutional Dimensions of Morguard
Investments Ltd., 22 CAN. Bus. L.J. 104, 107-115 (1993). The author notes that Art. 3164 of the
new Civil Code of Quebec adopts a two-pronged test (reciprocity and substantial connection)
which results in a narrower recognition rule than that suggested in Morguard.
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have interpreted Morguard's "real and substantial connection" test for
recognition and enforcement in its application to United States judg-
ments. Part IV will discuss why the fairness and public policy con-
cerns suggesting that Morguard's enforcement test should not be
extended to judgments from other countries are generally inapplicable
in the Canada-U.S. context. The commentary concludes with the sug-
gestion that the Morguard test is the appropriate standard for Cana-
dian common law courts to assess issues relating both to the assertion
of jurisdiction and to the recognition and enforcement of United
States judgments.
II. THE LANDMARK DECISION IN MORGUARD
A. Memories - The Pre-Morguard Regime
Pre-Morguard, Canadian courts utilized a rigid approach devel-
oped in nineteenth century England to determine whether a "foreign"
judgment should be given local effect.9 It is important to note that, in
Canada, for purposes of the rules of private international law, all juris-
dictions external to the provincial forum were considered to be "for-
eign," with the same rules applied to the recognition and enforcement
of foreign country judgments and judgments rendered by the courts of
sister-provinces. These traditional rules provided that unless the judg-
ment debtor was resident in the rendering court's territory, served
with originating process within that territory or attorned to the ren-
dering court's jurisdiction by appearing or agreeing to appear, the
judgment would not be enforceable in any of the common law prov-
inces and territories. 10 Absent these circumstances, Canadian defend-
9 The locus classicus of the traditional threshold jurisdictional test was the dictum of Buck-
ley L.J. in Emanuel v. Symon, 1 K.B. 302, 309 (C.A. 1908):
In actions in personam there are five cases in which the Courts of this country will enforce a
foreign judgment: (1) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the
judgment has been obtained; (2) where he was resident in the foreign country when the
action began; (3) where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum in
which he is afterwards sued; (4) where he has voluntarily appeared; and (5) where he has
contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained.
10 Under the traditional rules, out-of-province judgments will not be enforced unless the
rendering court had jurisdiction either over the defendant or over the subject matter of the
dispute. However, questions about the enforceability of a judgment usually center on the former
inquiry in circumstances where the defendant did not take part in the proceedings before the
rendering court. For a complete discussion on the historical and practical reasons for the reluc-
tance of Canadian courts to recognize extra-provincial judgments, see H. Patrick Glenn, Foreign
Judgments, the Common Law and the Constitutiom De Savoye v. Morguard Investments Ltd. 37
McGxL. LI. 537, 538-40 (1992).
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ants served ex juris" with extraprovincial process were customarily
advised to demur. This, in turn, required many extraprovincial judg-
ment creditors to relitigate their original causes of action in the de-
fendant's provincial forum with attendant delays, inconvenience and
expense.
B. The Times, They Are A' Changing - Morguard Investments
Ltd. v. De Savoye
The facts in Morguard are uncomplicated. Mr. De Savoye, at the
time a resident of Alberta, purchased some Alberta land financed by a
mortgage to Morguard. Subsequently, De Savoye moved to British
Columbia and defaulted on the mortgage. Morguard initiated a fore-
closure action in Alberta and served De Savoye ex juris in British Co-
lumbia. De Savoye did not defend the action and in no way attorned
or submitted to the jurisdiction of the Alberta court. Morguard ob-
tained a default judgment for the deficiency between the value of the
property sold in the foreclosure proceedings and the amount owing on
the mortgage and then brought an action in British Columbia to en-
force its Alberta judgment. De Savoye defended on the ground that
the Alberta court, under the traditional enforcement rules, lacked ju-
risdiction over him. Both the court of first instance' 2 and the British
Columbia Court of Appeal,' 3 albeit for different reasons, eschewed
the traditional rules and enforced the Alberta judgment.14 De
Savoye's appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was unanimously
dismissed.
In delivering the decision of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice La
Forest asserted that the traditional enforcement rules were inappro-
priate to present-day commercial requirements in general and to the
11 Canadian jurisdictional rules require personal service on the defendant within the prov-
ince or service ex juris as permitted by the rendering province's rules of court.
12 1 W.W.R. 87 (B.C.S.C. 1988).
13 5 W.W.R. 650 (B.C.C.A. 1988).
14 At first instance, Boyd J. held that the Alberta court had properly taken jurisdiction under
its own rules. Conventionally, this has not been considered a relevant criterion. See Joost Blom,
Case Note, Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 70 CAN. BAR REv. 733, 734 (1991). The
Court of Appeal, on the other hand, upheld enforcement on the basis of a "reciprocity" test,
viz., reciprocity of jurisdictional practice was established because the Alberta court took jurisdic-
tion in circumstances where, if the facts had occurred in British Columbia, the British Columbia
court would similarly have taken jurisdiction. The problems inherent in this equivalence of juris-
diction test have been documented: See Joost Blom, Comment, Conflict of Laws-Enforcement
of Extraprovincial Default Judgment-Reciprocity of Jurisdiction: Morguard Investments Ltd v.
De Savoye, 68 CAN. BAR REv. 359 (1989). For a Canadian perspective on the principle of juris-
dictional reciprocity, see Gilbert D. Kennedy, Reciprocity in the Recognition of Foreign Judg-
ments, 32 CAN. BAR REv. 359 (1954).
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enforcement of judgments from sister-provinces in particular. In the
broader context, he negatived the "power theory" of comity inherent
in the traditional rules' 5 and adopted "the more complete formula-
tion" of comity as set out by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Hilton v. Guyot
'Comity' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the leg-
islative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.'
6
Noting that modern rules of private international law must be based
on the need "to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across
state lines," La Forest J. held that what must underlie a modern sys-
tem of private international law "are principles of order and fairness,
principles that ensure security of transactions with justice."' 7
Specifically, concerning the recognition and enforcement of inter-
provincial judgments from sister-provinces, La Forest J. expressed his
view that Canadian courts had made a "serious error" in transposing
the rules developed for the enforcement of foreign judgments to judg-
ments from sister-provinces.'" Again, drawing on American experi-
ence, he noted that a "full faith and credit" regime of mutual
recognition of judgments across the country would also be inherent in
a federation such as Canada.'9 What recognition rule, then, followed
from these propositions? Canadian courts, he said, should recognize
"judgments given by a court in another province or territory, so long
as that court has properly or appropriately exercised jurisdiction in
15 The traditional common law rules regarding recognition and enforcement are anchored in
the principle of territoriality, viz., a sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction in its own territory
and its law has no binding effect outside that territory. Comity has been described as the defer-
ence and respect due by other sovereign states to the actions of a sovereign state legitimately
taken within its territory. Thus, if a state had "power" over the litigants via the traditional rules,
the judgments of its courts should be respected. See Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 268.
16 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
17 Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 269.
18 Id. at 270.
19 Id. It should be noted that La Forest J. stopped short of suggesting, as have some com-
mentators, that a "full faith and credit" clause should be read into the Canadian Constitution
thereby giving authority to the federal Parliament under its "peace, order and good govern-
ment" power to legislate respecting the recognition and enforcement of judgments throughout
Canada. What he did expressly suggest was that "the rules of comity or private international law
as they apply between the provinces must be shaped to conform to the federal structure of the
Constitution." In Hunt, 1 W.W.R. 129, the Morguard standard was subsequently accorded con-
stitutional status by the Supreme Court of Canada.
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the action."20 In La Forest J.'s view, this criterion was clearly met
when the rendering court exercised its jurisdiction on one of the tradi-
tional bases. But for cases not covered by the traditional rules, La
Forest J. fashioned a new recognition rule based upon whether the
rendering province had a "real and substantial connection" with the
litigation. 1 In the instant case, where the mortgaged properties were
situated in Alberta, the mortgages entered into by parties then resi-
dent in Alberta and the natural venue for consolidated foreclosure
and deficiency proceedings being Alberta, the requisite connection
was obvious.22
III. THE RECoGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED STATES
JUDGMENTS: POST-MORGUARD
The decision in Morguard raises many important questions. Was
its standard intended or should it be extended to permit recognition
and enforcement of international judgments in general and United
States judgments in particular, and, if so, what limitations should ap-
ply? Mr. Justice La Forest noted the correlative relationship between
the taking of jurisdiction by a court in one province and its recognition
in another on the basis of the real and substantial connection test. Yet,
because the connections between the Morguard litigation and the ren-
dering forum were incontrovertibly strong, there is a paucity of gui-
dance in the judgment concerning the threshold requirements for and
the limits of that test. In addition, while Morguard represents a major
development in the evolution of common law recognition and en-
forcement principles, what is its relevance to two provinces [New
Brunswick and Saskatchewan] where legislation specifically negatives
enforcement of extraprovincial judgments except in accordance with
statutory requirements? In the short time since Morguard, answers to
these questions are emerging.
Canada is similar to the United States in that the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is not governed by federal law but
20 Morguard, 76 D.LRAth at 273.
21 Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 275. In fashioning this test, La Forest J. acknowledged borrow-
ing from the language of the English House of Lords in Indyka v. Indyka, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 33,
[in relation to the recognition of foreign divorce decrees] and the decision of Dickson J. in
delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada)
Ltd., 43 D.L.R.3d 239 (Can. 1973), [in relation to the situs of a tort for jurisdictional purposes].
22 Morguard, 76 D.L.RAth at 277. To use Mr. Justice La Forest's words: "A more 'real and
substantial' connection between the damages suffered and the jurisdiction can scarcely be
imagined."
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by provincial law.2' In the common law provinces, short of relitigating
the original cause of action, there are two methods of enforcing for-
eign judgments: (1) by registering the judgment, where permitted,
under the respective provincial reciprocal enforcement of judgments
legislation, and (2) by bringing an action on the judgment.24
A. Registration under Reciprocal Enforcement Legislation
Each of the common law provinces and territories has enacted
reciprocal enforcement of judgments legislation to provide a registra-
tion procedure for the enforcement of extraprovincial judgments.25
The legislation provides an inexpensive and simple method for regis-
tering and enforcing the foreign judgments to which it applies instead
of the more lengthy and expensive method of enforcing such judg-
ments by action.26 Before a judgment creditor may take advantage of
its provisions, however, the Lieutenant-Governor of the enforcing
23 A number of Canadian commentators have suggested that the federal Parliament has con-
current legislative authority over the recognition and enforcement of judgments. See Vaughn
Black, Enforcement of Judgments and Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada, 9 OxFoRD J. LEGAL
STUIiEs 547,554-555 (1989); PErER W. HOGG, CONSTrrI ONAL LAW OF CANADA 563 (3d ed.
1992). Most recently, in Hunt, 1 W.W.R. at 155, La Forest J., delivering the judgment of the
S.C.C., expressed the view that these suggestions were indeed, "well founded." In the United
States, Congress possesses the power to regulate recognition of foreign judgments pursuant to
Article IV, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, but to date it has not exercised this power. Arguments
have been made that for public policy reasons, federal law as opposed to state law should be
used to determine the recognition and enforceability of foreign country judgments. See Willis
LM. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783,
788 (1950). For a full discussion see William C. Sturm, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 95
COM. L.J. 200, 201-202 (1990).
24 The judgment creditor may sue on the original cause of action because Canadian courts
treat a foreign judgment exclusively as a simple contract debt with the result that there is no
merger with the original cause of action unless the foreign judgment has been satisfied. See J.G.
CAsTEL, CANADIAN CoNSuCr OF LAws 3RD (1994) and the authorities cited at 258.
25 This legislation is largely based upon the Model Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Act prepared by the Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada. For a discussion of
its historical development, see Kurt Nadelmann, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada,
38 CAN. B. REv. 68 (1960). As to the legislation, see Court Order Enforcement Act, R.S.B.C., ch.
75 (1979) (B.C. Can.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A., ch. R-6 (1980) (Alta.
Can.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.S., ch. R-3 (1978) (Sask. Can.); Recipro-
cal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.M., ch. J-20 (1987) (Man. Can.); Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Judgments Act, R.S.O., ch. R-5 (1990) (Ont. Can.); R.S.N.B., ch R-3 (1973) (N.B.,
Can.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. R-6 (1988) (P.E.I., Can.);
S.N.S., ch. 388 (1989) (N.S., Can.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.Nfld., ch. R-4
(1990) (Nfid., Can.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.W.T., ch. R-1 (1988)
(N.W.T., Can.); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.Y., ch. 146 (1986) (Yukon,
Can.).
26 Canadian Credit Men's Trust Ass'n Ltd. v. Ryan, 1 D.L.R. 280, 281-82 (Alta. S.C. 1930).
When registration is granted by a court in the enforcing province, the foreign judgment has the
same effect as if it had been granted by the enforcing court.
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province must have declared the rendering state to be a reciprocating
state for purposes of the legislation. 27 In Saskatchewan, Ontario, New
Brunswick and the Northwest Territories, such a declaration is limited
to the sister-provinces and territories of Canada.28 In the other prov-
inces, the declaration of individual American states as reciprocating
jurisdictions has been made sparingly. The states of Washington,
Alaska, California, Oregon, Colorado and Idaho have been declared
reciprocating states for purposes of British Columbia's Court Order
Enforcement Act.29 The states of Washington and Idaho are recipro-
cating jurisdictions under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Act in both Alberta3 ° and Manitoba,31 and the state of Washington is
additionally recognized as a reciprocating state in the province of
Prince Edward Island.32
Even in the few situations where it is applicable, the reciprocal
enforcement legislation is of limited use to many United States judg-
ment creditors because it basically preserves all the common law de-
fenses which would apply if the judgment creditor had brought an
action on the foreign judgment. 33 Thus, a judgment will not be regis-
tered if, inter alia, the defendant "being a person who was neither car-
rying on business nor ordinarily resident in the state of the original
court, did not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit during the pro-
ceedings to the jurisdiction of that court."'  This, of course, is a statu-
tory codification of the rigid, traditional jurisdictional rules that were
rejected in Morguard. Does Morguard's broader recognition rule ex-
tend the basis for registration under the reciprocal enforcement legis-
lation or is its application restricted to actions on the judgment? The
Ontario Court of Appeal recently suggested that the statutory codifi-
27 See supra note 25, § . 39 (B.C.); § . 8 (Alta.); § . 9 (Sask.); § . 12 (Man.); § . 7 (Ont.); § . 8
(N.B.); §. 11 (P.E.I.); §. 10 (N.S.); §. 12 (Nfld.); § . 8 (N.W.T.); §. 9 (Yukon).
28 See supra note 25.
29 See supra note 25: Washington (effective July 6, 1989); Alaska, California, Oregon (effec-
tive September 25, 1989); Colorado, Idaho (effective July 1, 1990). See Consolidated Regula-
tions of British Columbia.
30 Reciprocating Jurisdiction Regulation, Alta. Reg. 344/85 as am.: Washington [Alta. Reg.
179/90, s. 2(b)], Idaho [Alta. Reg. 279/90, s. 2].
31 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Regulation as am., Man. Reg. 199/91, s. 3.
32 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act Order, EC845/90.
33 The common law defenses include lack of jurisdiction, proper service and lack of appear-
ance, fraud, finality, public policy and a good defense if an action were brought on the judgment.
The latter means a good defense to the action on the judgment (i.e., a defense going to the
jurisdiction of the rendering court) and not a good defense to the original cause of action. See
T.D.I. Hospitality Mgmt. Consultants Ina v. Brown, 3 W.W.R. 642 (Man. Q.B. 1993). For a full
discussion of the common law defenses, see CAsmL, supra note 24, at 289-291.
34 See supra note 25, § .31(6)(b) [B.C.]; §. 2 (6)(b) [Alta.]; §. 3(6)(b) [Man.]; §. 2(6)(b)
[P.E.I.]; §. 3(5)(b) [N.S.]; §. 3(6)(b) [Nfld.]; §. 2(6)(b) [Yukon].
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cation was a bar to the registration of a Saskatchewan default judg-
ment in Ontario. The basis of the court's reasoning was that
common law developments will not displace express statutory lan-
guage to the contrary. Even more recently, however, the Supreme
Court of Canada conferred constitutional status on the Morguard test
thereby requiring the courts in each province to give "full faith and
credit" to the judgments of the courts of sister-provinces. 36 In deliver-
ing the judgment of the Court, La Forest J. explained:
This does not mean, however, that a province is debarred from enacting
any legislation that may have some effect on litigation in other provinces
or indeed from enacting legislation respecting modalities for recognition
of judgments of other provinces. But it does mean that it must respect
the minimum standards of order and fairness addressed in Morguard37 .
The result is that the substantive aspects of each province's reciprocal
enforcement legislation will likely have to be modified in order to ac-
commodate the registration of intra-Canadian judgments on the basis
of Morguard's real and substantial connection test and its minimum
standards of order and fairness. 38 What effect such amendments
would have on United States reciprocating state judgments is indeter-inate because the application of Morguard's constitutional impera-
tive is obviously limited to an interprovincial context. Given these
realities, and given that Morguard's new recognition rule is much
broader than the present statutory substantive rules for registration, a
United States judgment creditor who is otherwise eligible should ap-
ply for registration of the judgment only where the United States ren-
dering court would have jurisdiction according to the traditional rules.
In all other cases, the prospects for recognition and enforcement are,
at present, better served by bringing an action on the judgment.
35 Acme Vdeo Ina v. Hedges, 12 O.R.3d 160 (Ont. C.A. 1993), rev'g 10 O.R.3d 503 (Ont.
Ct., Gen. Div. 1992).
36 Hunt, 1 W.W.R. at 153-54. La Forest J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, held that
the minimum standards of order and fairness addressed in Morguard were "constitutional
imperatives."
37 Hunt, 1 W.W.R. at 154.
38 CASTEL, supra note 24, at 292, alternatively suggests that it may suffice to interpret the
circumstances in which the court in the rendering province is deemed to have had jurisdiction in
order to incorporate the Morguard standard into the statutory substantive rules. He notes, how-
ever, that this approach has generally been rejected by Canadian courts on the basis of legisla-
tive supremacy, i.e., express statutory provisions will not be modified by the courts.
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B. Action on the Foreign Judgment Invoking Morguard's
Recognition Rule
Courts in all of Canada's provinces and the Northwest Territories
have now had the opportunity to consider Morguard's application.39
While the majority of these cases have dealt with Morguard's new rec-
ognition rule in an interprovincial context, several cases to date have
addresssed whether Morguard's real and substantial connection test
should be extended to permit the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments in general and United States judgments in particular.
In many parts of the Morguard decison, La Forest J. emphasized the
contrast between interprovincial judgments and truly "foreign" judg-
ments. He did indicate, however, in a strongly-worded obiter dictum, a
positive disposition towards reviewing Canada's recognition and en-
forcement rules for international judgments. His essential approach
was that the content of comity must be adjusted in light of a changing
world order to ensure the "security of transactions with justice:"
The business community operates in a world economy and we correctly
speak of a world community even in the face of decentralized political
and legal power. Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people
across state lines has now become imperative. Under these circum-
stances, our approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments would appear ripe for reappraisal. Certainly, other countries,
notably the United States and members of the European Economic
Community, have adopted more generous rules for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments to the general advantage of litigants.40
He went on to indicate that, in the absence of the systemic protections
inherent in the Canadian confederation, greater caution may be re-
quired in recognizing the long-arm jurisdiction of non-Canadian
courts.41 This has not deterred courts in three provinces from ex-
tending the Morguard principle to the enforcement of in personam
United States judgments.
The greatest acceptance towards recognition has occurred in the
province of British Columbia where Morguard has been applied eight
times by lower courts and once by the British Columbia Court of Ap-
peal to recognize default judgments emanating from Alaska,42 Ari-
39 The greatest incidence to date occurs in British Columbia, its province of origin.
40 Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 272-73.
41 Morguard, 76 D.L.RAth at 274. In his view, the overriding principle of fairness to the
defendant "requires that the judgment be issued by a court acting through fair process and with
properly restrained jurisdiction."
42 Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd, 5 W.W.R. 282 (B.C.S.C. 1992), aff'd 106 D.L.R.4th 654
(B.C.C.A. 1993).
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zona,43  California,44 Colorado,45  Connecticut,46 Oklahoma,47  and
Washington. 48 In each of these cases, notwithstanding that the defend-
ant was not resident in the state when the action was commenced, did
not attorn to the jurisdiction of the state court and did not appear in
the action, the default judgment was recognized on the basis that
there was a "real and substantial connection" between the original
action and the rendering state. The same approach has prevailed on a
single occasion in the lower courts of Alberta [to recognize a Hawai-
ian judgment]49 and Prince Edward Island [to recognize a Massachu-
setts judgment].50 The rationale employed by these courts is relatively
homogeneous. Morguard's suggestion, albeit in obiter, that the juris-
dictional curtain should be raised not only as between provinces but
also for foreign countries has been called "compelling," 51 "logical and
practical,"'52 "more comprehensive" 53 and "suited to the modem cir-
cumstances of today."54 Commercial necessity has been recognized as
a dominant consideration favouring extension. The words of Jenkins J.
in Allen v. Lynch are typical:
Comity calls for rules of private international law that are grounded in
the need in modern times to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and peo-
ple across state lines in a fair and orderly manner. The parochial interest
of individual states must give way to the principles of order and fairness in
a modern world where commerce as a rule rather than an exception
crosses jurisdictional lines. (emphasis added).
55
Another consideration, albeit underlying, is that in each of the forego-
ing cases, the requisite Morguard nexus sufficient to establish a "real
and substantial connection" was not only met, but met by a very clear
43 Minkler and Kirschbaum v. Sheppard, 60 B.C.L.R.2d 360 (B.C.S.C. 1991).
44 Clarke v. Lo Bianco, 84 D.LR.4th 244 (B.C.S.C. 1991); McMickle v. Van Straaten, 93
D.L.R.4th 74 (B.C.S.C. 1992).
45 Clancy v. Beach, 92 B,C.LR.2d 82 (B.C.S.C. 1994).
46 Stoddard v. Accurpress Manufacturing Ltd., 1 W.W.R. 677 (B.C.S.C. 1994).
47 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Vanstone, 88 D.L.R.4th 448 (B.C.S.C. 1992).
48 Kirsch v. Kucera, [1994] B.CJ. No. 432 (B.C.S.C.).
49 American Savings and Loan Association v. Stechishin (1976), 14 Alta.L.R.3d 255 (Alta.
Q.B.).
50 Allen v. Lynch, 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 43 (P.E.I.S.C. 1993).
51 See Clark v. Lo Bianco, 84 D.LR.4th 244,252 (B.C.S.C. 1991); Allen, 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
at 48-49.
52 Allen, 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. at 48. See also, Minkler and Kirschbaum v. Sheppard, 60
B.C.LR.2d 360, 363 (B.C.S.C. 1991) (Spencer J. identifies the "requirements of commerce in a
shrinking world" as a primary motivation favoring extension of Morguard).
53 Clarke, 84 D.L.R.4th at 252; Allen, 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. at 49.
54 Allen, 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. at 48.
55 See also Minkler and Kirschbaum v. Sheppard, 60 B.C.L.R.2d 360, 363 (B.C.S.C. 1991),
where Spencer J. identifies the "requirements of commerce in a shrinking world" as a primary
motivation favoring extension of Morguard.
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margin.56 Indeed, in each instance, it could be said that there was no
more reasonable place for the plaintiff's original action to be brought
than the rendering forum. Also, in each instance, the Canadian court
had no concern about the "quality of justice to be meted out" by the
rendering forum.57
Against this current of otherwise universal judicial acceptance
that Morguard does extend the common law principles under which a
Canadian court would recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign court, is
the very recent decision in Evans Dodd v. Gambin Associates.58 An
English firm of solicitors was requested by an Ontario lawyer to pro-
vide legal services in connection with an international business trans-
action in circumstances which rendered the Ontario lawyer directly
responsible for payment of the solicitors' account. The business trans-
action aborted, the solicitors' account went unpaid and the firm ob-
tained a default United Kindom judgment against the Ontario lawyer.
It then applied, under Ontario's reciprocal enforcement legislation,
59
to register the judgment. The legislation required the registering court
to consider the common law principles under which a Canadian court
will recognize the jurisdiction of a foreign court.60 Sheard J., in dis-
missing the application for registration, limited Morguard's reach to
domestic judgments:
Morguard did not alter the law relating to the enforcement in Canada of
judgments of courts outside Canada. Although there have been judg-
ments since Morguard that apply its test to judgments originating outside
Canada, it is too soon to say that the extension of the Morguard test is
now the law of Canada. The three cases that have been mentioned (Lo
Bianco, Minkler and Fabrelle) are initiatives taken by judges responsive
to the obiter dictum in Morguard and illustrate the process of develop-
ment of the common law. However, and without comparing the circum-
stances in those cases with the case before me, I do not think it would be
fair for me to take such an initiative and thereby to deprive the respon-
dent of the opportunity to present its defences and cross-claims in a
court in this jurisdiction.
61
56 The relevant variables to be considered in determining the existence of a "real and sub-
stantial connection" are fully discussed in Part III, infra.
57 This lack of concern about the quality of justice in the rendering forum is seen in the
opinion of Gow J. in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Vanstone, 88 D.L.R.4th 448, 463 (B.C.S.C.
1992).
58 17 O.R.3d 803 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div. 1994).
59 Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.O. ch. R-6 (1990) (Ont. Can.).
60 The registration of a judgment shall be refused if the original court is not regarded as
having jurisdiction. Id., art. IV(1)(c). This Act also contains a basket-clause which provides that
the original court shall be regarded as having jurisdiction if the jurisdiction of the original court
is otherwise recognized by the registering court. Id-, art. V(1)(f).
61 17 O.R.3d at 809-810.
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It is unfortunate that Sheard J. was unaware of or chose to ignore the
additional Canadian authorities, including appellate authority, sug-
gesting that Morguard's recognition rule should be extended to inter-
national judgments. It is equally unfortunate that he did not choose to
compare the circumstances in the case before him with those prevail-
ing in the three cases he referred to. Had his examination of the au-
thorities been more comprehensive and had he made the relevant
factual comparisons, he might have concluded that the English forum
was the only reasonable forum for the plaintiff's action to take place.
The subject matter of the action concerned a contract for legal serv-
ices. The contract was made in the United Kingdom, to be performed
in the United Kingdom, with £ sterling the currency of the contract
and English law its proper law. The commercial project to be financed
was a United Kingdom project. The only connection with the province
of Ontario was that an Ontario lawyer had requested the services of
the English solicitors. Although Sheard J.'s terse rationale for refusing
to extend Morguard centered on fairness, his judgment displays a
complete absence of detail to substantiate why it would have been
unfair to the Ontario solicitor to allow the natural forum to exercise
jurisdiction. Indeed, if there was any credible jurisdictional argument
to be advanced, the United Kingdom rules expressly authorized a pro-
cedure by which the jurisdiction of the court could have been chal-
lenged without submitting to its jurisdiction.62 While it is true that
Sheard J. was not strictly bound by precedent to recognize the United
Kingdom judgment, his refusal to apply the obiter dictum of a unani-
mous S.C.C. is all the more curious given the absence of any policy
rationale for doing so. Ordinarily, lower courts incline to follow not
only the strict ratio decidendi of S.C.C. judgments, but also any consid-
ered decision of that court on a question of law or principle.63 The
approach in Evans Dodd can be contrasted with the decision of Mac-
Pherson J. in Arrowmaster Inc. v. Unique Forming Ltd., wherein he
suggested that Morguard's doctrinal principles are equally applicable
in an international enforcement context unless the substantive law of
the foreign state or its legal process is radically different from that of
62 See Rule 8 of Order 12, The Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, S.I. 1965/1776 (Eng.). If it
is determined that the court does have jurisdiction from the standpoint of its domestic rules and
procedures, the defendant is then required to decide whether or not to appear and defend.
63 See Sellars v. The Queen, 110 D.L.R.3d 629 (Can. 1980), where it is made clear that even
obiter dicta of the Supreme Court of Canada should be followed. For a summary of how lower
courts, including courts of appeal, should treat such obiter dicta, see Scarff v. Wilson, 3 W.W.R.
259 (B.C.C.A. 1989).
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Ontario.64 Given this and the otherwise unanimous judicial extension
of Morguard's new common law recognition rule, it was incumbent
upon Sheard J. to provide a cogent rationale for his departure. His
failure to do so renders the decision undeserving of support.
In summary, Morguard provides a strong rationale in favor of ex-
tending the real and substantial connection test to the enforcement of
international judgments. The traditional jurisdictional rules set out in
Emanuel6" were not fashioned upon "the need in modern times to
facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines in a
fair and orderly manner. ' 66 The Morguard test, in contrast, was specif-
ically formulated to meet these modern transactional requirements
under the redefined principle of comity. It is not without significance
that in its first opportunity, post-Morguard, the Supreme Court of
Canada again stressed the role of comity and the need to adjust its
content in light of the changing world order.67 The net result is that
more U.S. default judgments are likely to be recognized and enforced
in Canada's common law provinces and territories. Conversely,
United States plaintiffs are likely to find an increasing number of Ca-
nadian defendants appearing in United States fora to contest jurisdic-
tion and/or the substantive merits of litigation.
C. Morguard's Restricted Status in New Brunswick and
Saskatchewan
The ability of a United States judgment creditor to bring an ac-
tion on the judgment invoking Morguard's broad recognition rule is
further complicated in the provinces of New Brunswick and Saskatch-
ewan. These two provinces have enacted uniform legislation dealing
with the conditions for recognition of all foreign judgments, whether
by registration or action on the judgment.68 The Foreign Judgments
64 17 O.R.3d 407, 411 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div. 1993). Because the case dealt with the enforce-
ment of an Illinois judgment rendered after the Ontario defendant attomed to the jurisdiction of
the Illinois court and after a full trial, MacPherson J.'s comments regarding the scope of
Morguard's application are obiter dicta.
65 See Emanuel, 1 K.B. 302.
66 Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 274.
67 Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), 102
D.L.R.4th 96, 118 (S.C.C. 1993). It is also of significance that in the province of Quebec, where
developing common law principles are generally inapplicable, Morguard's broader definition of
comity has been adopted by the Court of Appeal to recognize a default U.S. judgment in favor
of a New Jersey casino: See Resorts International Hotel Inc. v. Auerbach, 89 D.L.R.4th 688 (Que.
C.A. 1991).
68 This legislation is based on the Uniform Law Conference of Canada's Model Foreign
Judgments Act adopted in 1933 and revised and amended on a number of occasions. See Castel,
supra note 24, at 176.
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Act69 of each province preserves the pre-Morguard common law de-
fenses to enforcement, including the defense that the rendering court
had no jurisdiction. 70 Significantly, however, for the present discus-
sion, these Acts further provide that foreign courts have in personam
jurisdiction "only" if the defendant was ordinarily resident in the ren-
dering state at the time the action was commenced or submitted to the
jurisdiction of the rendering court by counterclaiming, voluntarily ap-
pearing without protest or agreeing to submit expressly or impliedy.
71
In the immediate aftermath of Morguard, there was judicial support
for the view that non-compliance with such statutory prerequisites was
not a bar to recognition of a foreign judgment under the broader
Morguard principle.72 This was quickly negatived,73 however, and
there is now appellate authority that Morguard's "real and substantial
connection" criteria for recognition has no application in New Bruns-
wick and Saskatchewan on the basis that common law principles gov-
erning the enforcement of foreign judgments are displaced by the
specific wording of the Act. In Cardinal Couriers Ltd. v. Noyes,74 for
example, an action to enforce a default Ontario judgment in Saskatch-
ewan failed because the defendant was not resident in Ontario, did
not carry on business there and did not submit to the jurisdiction of
the Ontario court. In light of the recent decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Hunt v. T & N plc,75 the result in such cases can no
longer be supported as a new interprovincial enforcement remedy
based on "full faith and credit" has now come into force owing to
Morguard's "constitutional imperative. '76 It remains to be seen how,
if at all, the legislatures of New Brunswick and Saskatchewan will deal
with the impact of Hunt on their respective Foreign Judgments Acts.
Legislative inactivity could produce the judicial result of "reading
69 The Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B., ch. F-19 (1973) (Can.); The Foreign Judgments Act,
R.S.S., ch. F-18 (1978) (Can.).
70 Foreign Judgements Act (N.B.), § 5(a); The Foreign Judgments Act (Sask.), § . 6(a).
71 The Foreign Judgments Act (N.B.), § 2; The Foreign Judgment Act (Sask.), § . 3.
72 See &g., Beaver Diversified Corp. v. Walker, [1992] N.B.J. No. 527 (N.B.Q.B.); Fabrelle
Wallcoverings & Textiles Ltd. v. North American Decorative Products Inc., 6 C.P.C.3d 170 (Ont.
Ct., Gen. Div. 1992); Acme Video Inc. v. Hedges, 10 O.R.3d 503 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div. 1992).
73 844903 Ontario Ltd. v. VanderPluijm (1992), 12 C.P.C.3d 71 (N.B.Q.B.); Mutuellistes
Caisse d'Epargne et de Credit c. Fortin, [1992] A.N.B. No. 613 (N.B.Q.B.); Acme Video, 100.R.3d
503.
74 101 D.L.R.4th 712 (Sask. CA. 1993). An application to register a default Ontario judg-
ment in New Brunswick was rejected on similar grounds. See Sims v. Bower, 108 D.L.R.4th 677
(N.B.C.A. 1993).
75 See Hunt 1 W.W.R. 129.
76 Id. at 153.
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down"77 the legislation to accommodate "full faith and credit" for in-
terprovincial judgments while maintaining the clear legislative intent
for non-Canadian foreign judgments. Alternatively, the legislatures
could accomplish the same result by amending the definition of "for-
eign judgment" to delete intra-Canadian judgments from its reach.78
In either of these instances, an extension of Morguard's recognition
rule to United States judgments would remain legislatively pre-
empted. A more promising alternative, from the standpoint of achiev-
ing a broader recognition of United States judgments, would be to
amend the legislation by deleting the word "only" from the section
enumerating the circumstances where a foreign court has jurisdiction
and, further, expressly providing that the Foreign Judgments Act does
not prevent the recognition of foreign judgments in circumstances not
covered by its provisions.79 Only this latter approach would permit
judicial extension of Morguard's recognition rule to United States
judgments in New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. For the time being,
however, the only way a United States judgment can be enforced in
these two provinces is under the existing "inelastic code" of the For-
eign Judgments Act.80
In all the common law provinces and territories, except New
Brunswick and Saskatchewan, a United States judgment creditor can
bring an action at common law to enforce his judgment. Historically,
he could succeed only if the United States rendering court assumed
jurisdiction in accordance with the traditional common law rules. Post-
Morguard, he might succeed if the "real and substantial connection"
standard is met.
77 The "reading down" doctrine requires that, whenever possible, the general language in a
statute which extends beyond the power of the enacting legislature be construed more narrowly
so as to keep it within the constitutional scope of power. See Hogg, supra note 23, at 393 and the
case authorities cited therein.
78 The uniform legislation presently defines "foreign country" as "any country other than
this province, whether a kingdom, empire, republic, commonwealth, state, dominion, province,
territory, colony, possession or protectorate, or a part thereof." Foreign Judgements Act (N.B.),
§ 1. See also The Foreign Judgements Act (Sask.), § (c).
79 This was first proposed by Castel, supra note 24, at 284. A useful American precedent is
provided by the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognitions Act, § 5(b), 13 U.L.A. 263
(1962), which permits a court to recognize a foreign judgment on jurisdictional grounds not spe-
cifically enumerated.
80 844903 Ontario Ltd., 12 C.P.C.3d 71, 81 (N.B.Q.B. 1992).
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IV. WHAT KIND OF REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
Morguard is unclear on precisely what must be really and sub-
stantially connected with the rendering state.81 La Forest J.'s judgment
refers imprecisely to the requisite nexus as between "the subject mat-
ter of the action and the territory where the action is brought,"' 2 the
"action" and the province,83 the "relevant transaction" and the ren-
dering province,84 "the damages suffered and the [rendering] jurisdic-
tion,"85 "the defendant and the forum province, '86 and the [rendering
forum's] connection with the transaction or the parties."'  At first
glance, it is readily apparent that some of these formulations would
render Canada's "real and substantial connection" test for jurisdiction
different from the "minimum contacts" test employed by American
courts to resolve similar issues. In addition to recognizing traditional
bases of jurisdiction, United States courts recognize jurisdiction based
on service ex juris when a defendant has sufficient "minimum con-
tacts" with the rendering forum.88 A trilogy of United States Supreme
Court cases in the 1980's reaffirmed that the "substantial connection"
between the defendant and the forum necessary for a finding of mini-
81 This lack of precision has been criticized. See C.A. Walsh, Canadian Private International
Law After De Savoye v. Morguard Investments, 8 SOL. JO. (N.B.), Issue 2, 1 (1992); Vaughn
Black and John Swan, Comment, New Rules for the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 12 AD-
voc. Q. 489,499-500 (1990-91); Elizabeth R. Edinger, Notes of Cases, Conflict of Laws-Juris-
diction-British Columbia Residents Bringing Action for Damages in Texas Against Non British
Columbia Resident Defendants-Seeking Anti-Suit Injunction in British Columbia.. Anchem
Products v. Workers' Compensation Board, 71 CAN. B. Rav. 117, 139-140 (1992); Peter Finkle
and Claude Labrecque, Low-Cost Legal Remedies and Market Efficiency: Looking Beyond
Morguard, 22 CAN. B. REv. 58, 66-67 (1992); Woods, supra note 8, at 128-129.
82 Morguard, 76 D.LR.4th at 275.
83 1d, at 278.
84 Id. at 274-75.
85 Id. at 277.
86 Id. at 278.
87 Id.
88 Challenges to state court jurisdiction on the failure to meet the "minimum contacts" stan-
dard are among the most frequently litigated in the United States. See V. Black, Note, Legisla-
tion: Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act et aL, 71 Can. B. Rev. 721, 725 (1992).
For recent United States Supreme Court decisions on the issue, see. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine
Corp., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Burger king Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 15:491 (1995)
mum contacts must come about by "an action of the defendant pur-
posefully directed toward the forum State."89
In a prescient analysis immediately following Morguard, Profes-
sor Blom opined that the imprecision of La Forest J.'s formulations
suggested two underlying and competing theories of jurisdiction.90
The first, an "administration of justice" theory, is based on the prem-
ise that the original forum must meet a minimum standard of suitabil-
ity for adjudication. All relevant factors would be examined by the
enforcement court in an effort to ascertain not whether the rendering
court was the best possible forum for serving the interests of the par-
ties and the ends of justice, but rather whether it was "a reasonable
place for the action to take place."91 The alternative approach is based
on a "personal subjection" theory of jurisdiction. Under this ap-
proach, the rendering court's assumption of jurisdiction is appropri-
ate, providing the defendant lived or carried on business in the
rendering territory or voluntarily did some act in relation to it
whereby he either contemplated or should have contemplated that he
might be sued there.
In terms of post-Morguard caselaw, lower courts appear, at first
glance, to have indiscriminately applied either or both approaches in
determining whether a sufficient "real and substantial connection" ex-
isted to enable the rendering court to assume jurisdiction.
A. Personal Subjection Approach
The personal subjection approach is clearly the most popular in
personal injury litigation due, perhaps, to its aegis as a jurisdictional
test in an interprovincial products liability case decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada many years before Morguard. In Moran v.
Pyle National (Canada) Ltd.,92 an electrician was fatally injured in
Saskatchewan while removing a light bulb manufactured by an Onta-
rio company that did not carry on business or have assets in Saskatch-
89 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. The "pur-
poseful availment" test was initially asserted in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958):
"...[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws."
90 Blom, supra note 14, at 741.
91 This phraseology was used by La Forest . in Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th, at 277.
92 43 D.L.R.3d 239 (Can. 1974). In Morguard, La Forest . quoted and applied Moran's
principles. See Morguard, 76 D.L.RAth at 276-77.
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ewan.93 The electrician's wife and children commenced an action in
Saskatchewan against the company alleging that the company had
been negligent in the manufacturing of the light bulb. In determining
the situs of the tort for jurisdictional purposes, 94 Mr. Justice Dickson,
speaking for a unanimous Court, employed a "real and substantial
connection" test reasoning that when a manufacturer negligently man-
ufactured products and placed them into the stream of commerce
through normal distribution channels in circumstances where the
manufacturer knew or ought to have known that the products might
cause injury, the province where a plaintiff suffered injury had a real
and substantial connection with the action sufficient to assert jurisdic-
tion. The potentially lower threshold in personal injury cases for the
sufficiency of the "real and substantial connection" fashioned by the
S.C.C. in Moran and the "substantial connection" between the de-
fendant and forum state to establish jurisdiction using the "purposeful
availment" test in a minimum contacts analysis should be noted. The
Canadian jurisdictional rule recognizes a paramount state interest in
injuries suffered by persons within its territory.95 In a products liability
context, for example, it unequivocally asserts that a manufacturer, by
tendering his products in the marketplace directly or through normal
distributive channels, ought to assume the burden of defending those
products wherever they cause harm as long as the forum into which
the manufacturer is taken is one that he reasonably ought to have had
in his contemplation when he so tendered his goods.96 In contrast,
while the United States Supreme Court is agreed that the necessary
"substantial connection" between a defendant and the forum state
must derive from an action of the defendant purposely directed to-
ward the forum state, its decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Supe-
93 All of the defendant's operations took place in Ontario. It sold its products exclusively to
distributors and had no direct contact with consumers. It had no salespersons or agents in
Saskatchewan.
94 The Saskatchewan court rules provided for service ex juris when "the action.... is
founded on a tort committed within the jurisdiction."
95 The recent decision in Sobstyl v. Finzer, [1993] B.CJ. No. 33 (B.C.S.C.) is illustrative.
The British Columbia plaintiff brought a negligence action in her home province against an
Albertan doctor for medical advice he provided when she was a transient employee in Alberta.
Moran was applied to establish British Columbia's real and substantial connection with the ac-
tion on the sole basis that the plaintiff acted on the doctor's advice there and the harm occurred
there.
96 In Moran, the province of Saskatchewan was held entitled to assert jurisdiction notwith-
standing that the defendant, Pyle, did not carry on business in the province, had no property or
assets there, carried on all of its manufacturing and assembly operations outside the province,
sold all of its products to distributors and none directly to consumers and had no salesmen or
agents within Saskatchewan. Moran, 43 D.L.R.3d at 240.
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rior CoUrt9 7 illustrates a deep division on the question of whether the
mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce can ever
constitute the requisite purposeful availment even if it is done with an
awareness that the stream will sweep the product into the forum state.
For personal injury cases, therefore, the minimum threshold necessary
to satisfy Moran's personal subjection test for jurisdiction may be less
than a United States minimum contacts analysis would dictate. In the
context of Canadian recognition and enforcement, what this means is
that U.S. judgments meeting either interpretation of the "purposeful
availment" standard would meet Canada's real and substantial con-
nection test, providing the recognition court applies the personal sub-
jection approach to its determination.
Given the lengthy judicial familiarity in Canada with the Moran
test for jurisdiction, and given Morguard's new mandate that recogni-
tion is a correlative of jurisdiction,98 the popularity of the personal
subjection approach to determining the existence of a real and sub-
stantial connection is unsurprising. McMickle v. Van Straaten99 is an
example of its application for recognition purposes in a products lia-
bility context. The defendant was resident in British Columbia and
advertised a facial cream product in United States national publica-
tions and television commercials in California. The California plaintiff
used the product and suffered pain and facial disfigurement. She sued
the defendant in California, obtained a default judgment and, invok-
ing Morguard, brought an action to enforce that judgment in British
Columbia. It was held that, notwithstanding that he did not carry on
business in California, the defendant acted in such a way as to attract
California business and that connection was of a kind which made it
reasonable to infer that he had voluntarily submitted himself to the
risk of litigation in California. In the words of McKenzie J.: "He was
firing long-range artillery from Vancouver which landed in California.
97 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justices Powell and
Scalia, opined that the purposeful availment test would not be satisfied in the absence of addi-
tional conduct to clearly indicate an intent to serve the forum state market. In contrast, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, disagreed with that interpretation.
In their view, as long as a defendant was aware that its product was being marketed in the forum
state, no showing of additional conduct would be required to find jurisdiction.
98 It is noteworthy that while the jurisdiction of the Saskatchewan court to adjudicate the
substantive merits of the Moran claim was recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada, the
resulting judgment would have been unenforceable in Ontario under the traditional pre-
Morguard rules.
99 93 D.L.R.4th 74. From a jurisdictional standpoint, the facts reveal that this case would
pass Moran's personal subjection test as well as any requisite "purposeful availment" component
of a minimum contacts analysis.
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He must accept the risk of damage from his shells at the place where
they landed."'1° The identical approach has been readily applied to
acknowledge United States state jurisdiction in other kinds of per-
sonal injury litigation.10'
The personal subjection test has also been applied to recognize
jurisdiction in commercial transactions litigation. In Minkler and
Kirschbaum v. Shepard,102 the defendant and her husband moved
from British Columbia to Arizona. The couple lived there for ten
months and then separated, whereupon the defendant moved back to
British Columbia. An Arizona law firm brought an action in Arizona
for services rendered to her husband's companies during the period
when the couple were living there. Under Arizona statutory law a
spouse may be liable for the community debts of the married couple
whether or not that spouse contracts directly for liability. The defend-
ant was served ex juris, a default judgment was obtained in Arizona
and an action was subsequently commenced in British Columbia to
enforce it. Using a personal subjection approach to find the requisite
real and substantial connection, Mr. Justice Spencer stated:
Here, the defendant was in Arizona as a resident when the services were
provided by the plaintiff to her husband's companies and when he en-
tered into the co-obligor's undertaking .... She voluntarily subjected
herself to Arizona law by going there to live. The fact that she might not
have been aware of the community property laws of that State and their
effect upon her to make her liable for her husband's debts is not rele-
vant. Ignorance of the law can not be a defence. Arizona law must be the
law which governs the resolution of issues in the case. Thus there is a
substantial connection between the subject matter of the action and the
State of Arizona. (emphasis added)0 3.
Similarly, in Clancy v. Beach, the fact that the British Columbia
defendants solicited the plaintiff in Colorado by fax, telex, electronic
mail and telephone and had many meetings with him in Colorado was
sufficient to convince the enforcement court that " . . [the defend-
ants] ought reasonably to have contemplated that the Colorado court
could have exercised jurisdiction."'1
100 Id. at 82.
101 In Clarke; for example, the defendant podiatrist treated the plaintiff while both resided in
California: Clark, 84 D.L.R.4th 244. After the physician had moved to British Columbia, the
defendant brought a malpractice action against him in California. Her default judgment was
enforced in British Columbia on the basis that he, too, in these circumstances, had "voluntarily
submitted himself to the risk of litigation in California."
102 Minkler, 60 B.C.L.R.2d 360.
103 See Minkler, 60 B.C.L.R.2d at 364.
104 Clancy, 92 B.C.L.R.2d at 95.
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B. Administration of Justice Approach
Although the foregoing cases evidence the willingness of Cana-
dian courts to apply the personal subjection test to determine the
existence of a real and substantial connection, further examination
reveals that many courts have applied the broader administration of
justice approach to jurisdiction in commercial transactions cases.
These courts appear to be assessing whether, under the circumstances,
sufficient "contacts" exist with the subject matter of the litigation and
the parties to permit the rendering court to assume jurisdiction, an
approach not unlike the U.S. "minimum contacts" test but with the
notable difference that the minimum sufficiency is not determined ex-
clusively vis-a-vis the defendant and rendering forum but vis-a-vis all
aspects of the litigation, including the parties, and the rendering fo-
rum. Several post-Morguard examples can be cited.
In Allen v. Lynch,105 a Massachusetts default judgment for debt
against a Florida resident was enforced in Prince Edward Island. The
fact that both parties were resident in Massachusetts at the time when
the defendant executed his promissory note and that Massachusetts
law was the proper law of the contract were held to be sufficient con-
nections between the "subject matter of the action" and the Massa-
chusetts forum.'06 In American Savings and Loan Association v.
Stechishin, °7 an Alberta court enforced a Hawaiian default judgment
against Alberta residents who had borrowed money secured by a
mortgage and promissory note from a Hawaiian lending institution. In
concluding that Hawaii was the "most appropriate" original forum,
the court was influenced by several factors including place of the con-
tract, its proper law, its underlying subject matter (Hawaiian land) and
the fact that the plaintiff resided and carried on business in Hawaii
when the contract was made. Similar factors motivated a British Co-
lumbia court to find the requisite real and substantial connection be-
tween "the jurisdiction of the foreign [Oklahoma] court, the
transaction in respect of which it has granted judgment and the
defendant.'
0 8
Lesser connections have sufficed. In Kirsch v. Kucera,109 for ex-
ample, the court found a real and substantial connection between the
plaintiff's action in debt and the rendering Washington forum based
105 Allen v. Lynch, 111 Nfld & P.E.I.R. 43 (P.E.I.S.C. 1993).
106 Id. at 52.
107 See Stechishin, 14 Alta.L.R.3d 255.
108 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Vanstone, 88 D.L.R.4th 448, 463 (B.C.S.C. 1992).
109 See supra note 49.
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solely on the plaintiff's residence in Washington, the fact that meet-
ings concerning the loans took place in Washington and the defend-
ant's cheques were dishonoured when presented to a Washington
bank. One court has even suggested that a sufficient connection be-
tween the territory and one or more of the plaintiff,10 defendant and
subject matter of the action would suffice, adding that in complex
cases the rendering territory does not have to be the only one with
real and substantial connections or even the one with the most real
and substantial connections. In Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd.,"'
the defendant had agreed to build a fishing boat for the plaintiff, a
resident of Alaska, who executed the contract in Alaska and received
financing for his purchase from the Alaskan government. The defend-
ant carried on business exclusively in British Columbia, designed and
built the boat there and subsequently had it delivered to the plaintiff
in Alaska. After problems developed with the boat, the plaintiff sued
in Alaska and obtained a default judgment which he afterwards sued
upon in British Columbia. Mr. Justice Huddart held that the courts of
either British Columbia or Alaska would have been a "reasonable fo-
rum," and cited the following "sufficient contacts" to satisfy the
Morguard standard: Alaska was the place where the plaintiff resided,
where he signed the contract for construction of the boat, where he
financed the boat, where he used it, where it was repaired and where
he suffered damage." 2
The administration of justice approach to resolving jurisdictional
issues in complex international commercial transactions with multiple
jurisdictional "contacts" was recently reinforced by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Work-
ers' Compensation Board)."3 The case involved an anti-suit injunction
against residents of British Columbia from bringing an action in Texas
and the question of appropriate forum arose. Mr. Justice Sopinka, in
110 It should be noted that substantial authority exists to suggest that the requisite connection
cannot be established solely on the basis of the plaintiff's relationship to the rendering forum.
See Canadian Int'L Mktg. Distrib. Ltd. v. Nitsuko Ltd., 56 B.C.L.R.2d 130 (B.C.C.A. 1990); Wil-
son v. Moyes, 13 O.R.3d 202 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div. 1993); First City Trust Company v. Inuvik
Automobile Wholesale Ltd. [1993] N.W.TJ. No. 77 (N.W.T.S.C.); Webb v. Hooper, [1994] A.J.
No. 335 (Alta. Q.B.).
111 5 W.W.R. 282 (1992).
112 In contrast, Cumming, J.A., delivering the judgment of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, applied a personal subjection approach and held that the jurisdiction issue fit directly
within the rule in Moran v. Pyle which "appl[ied] with even greater force in the case at bar,
where the boat was specifically manufactured to American standards for Moses' use in Alaska."
106 D.L.R.4th at 665.
113 102 D.L.R.4th 96.
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delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court, made the following
comments about choice of forum realities in today's complex global
trading environment:
With the increase of free trade and the rapid growth of multi-national
corporations it has become more difficult to identify one clearly appro-
priate forum for this type of litigation. The defendant may not be identi-
fied with only one jurisdiction. Moreover, there are frequently multiple
defendants carrying on business in a number of jurisdictions and distrib-
uting their products or services world wide. As well, the plaintiffs may be
a large class residing in different jurisdictions. It is often difficult to
pinpoint the place where the transaction giving rise to the action took
place. Frequently, there is no single forum that is clearly the most conve-
nient or appropriate for the trial of the action but rather several which
are equally suitable alternatives.... I recognize that there will be cases
in which the best that can be achieved is to select an appropriate forum.
Often there is no one forum which is clearly more appropriate than
others.
1 1 4
He then went on to delineate the role that forum conveniens consider-
ations should play when Canadian courts are called upon to assess the
propriety of a foreign court assuming jurisdiction:
[W]hen a foreign court assumes jurisdiction on a basis that generally
conforms to our rule of private international law relating to the forum
non conveniens, that decision will be respected and a Canadian court
will not purport to make the decision for the foreign court. The policy of
our courts with respect to comity demands no less.
115
Factors such as the governing law, the location in which the parties to
the action carry on business, the location of witnesses, the location
from which the majority of evidence emanates, the location where the
principal facts in dispute are concentrated and geographical factors
suggesting a natural forum have been identified as variables relevant
in applying Amchem to the determination of the appropriate forum."1
6
Although Amchem was an anti-suit injunction case and directed
to forum conveniens considerations, such considerations are interre-
lated with the issue of jurisdiction simpliciter in the context of recogni-
tion and enforcement. If the Morguard rule is to be extended to
international judgments, forum conveniens considerations will have to
be assessed by the recognition court whether as part and parcel of the
114 Id. at 102.
115 Id. at 120. It should be noted that jurisdiction simpliciter and forum conveniens in Canada
are generally viewed as part of a two-stage sequential analysis, i.e. it is only if there is a finding of
jurisdiction simpliciter that it becomes necessary to apply forum conveniens considerations to
decide whether or not jurisdiction should be declined. See Ell v. Con-Pro Industries Ltd., 11
B.C.A.C. 174 (B.C.C.A. 1992); Exta-Sea Charters Ltd. v. Formalog Ltd., 55 B.C.L.R.2d 197
(B.C.S.C. 1991).
116 See, &g., Applied Processes Ina v. Crane Co., 15 O.R.3d 166 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div. 1993).
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"real and substantial connection" test of jurisdiction or as part of a
"fairness" check superimposed on it. Of importance to American
plaintiffs suing Canadian defendants in American courts is that
Amchem clarifies at what point in the proceedings these issues should
be initially raised."
7
C. Flexible Approach Based on "Order & Fairness"
The foregoing analysis suggests that Canadian recognition courts
are likely to apply the personal subjection approach to determine the
existence of a real and substantial connection for jurisdictional pur-
poses in personal injury cases. In other types of cases, the courts ap-
pear to be using both personal subjection and administration of justice
approaches to the jurisdictional question. Yet, in each of these latter
cases, owing to multiple connections with the rendering forum, the
results would arguably be the same regardless of which approach was
used to determine the issue." 8 Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd.," 9
is illustrative. The two courts to consider the jurisdiction issue both
concluded that the rendering Alaska forum had the requisiste real and
substantial connection, yet each applied a different approach to deter-
mine its existence.120 That this will often occur should not be unex-
pected. Unlike the United States "minimum contacts" approach which
requires the defendant's purposeful availment towards the plaintiff's
chosen forum state, the Canadian standard only requires that there be
such sufficient contacts with that state to establish that it was or
should have been in the defendant's reasonable contemplation that he
might be sued there. Therefore, when a Canadian court applies the
117 Post-Amchem, Canadian defendants will most likely be advised to appear in the U.S. fo-
rum to contest jurisdiction. It is unlikely that this would constitute a voluntary submission to
jurisdiction under the traditional common law recognition rules. See Clinton v. Ford, 137
D.L.R.3d 281 (Ont. C.A. 1982); Dovenmuehle v. Rocca Group Ltd., 34 N.B.R.2d 444 (N.B.C.A.
1981), aff'd 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can. 1982). These cases make the defendant's submission to the merits
of the case a minimum threshold to constitute a voluntary appearance. If the U.S. court refuses
to stay or dismiss the action, the defendant could either bring an application before a Canadian
court for an anti-suit injunction or allow the plaintiff to obtain a default judgment expecting to
raise the jurisdictional issue in the enforcement action. In either case, however, Amchem makes
it more difficult for the defendant to succeed because it mandates that a Canadian court's assess-
ment of whether it was "reasonable" for a foreign court to assume jurisdiction will not be tested
de novo but by reference to whether it was reasonable for the foreign court to conclude that
there was no alternative forum that was clearly more appropriate.
118 This is not to suggest that some future case will not require a choice of approach: See
Bom, supra note 14, at 742-745.
119 5 W.W.R. 282 (B.C.S.C. 1992).
120 At first instance, Huddart, J., 5 W.W.R. 282 (B.C.S.C. 1992), applied the administration of
justice approach to the jurisdictional issue, whereas Cumming, J.A., 106 D.L.R.4th 654
(B.C.C.A. 1993), reached the same conclusion applying the personal subjection approach.
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broader administration of justice approach in applying Morguard's
recognition rule and concludes that, in all the circumstances, there was
a sufficient "real and substantial connection" which the litigation or
transaction had with the rendering forum, the result usually can be
easily rationalized on narrower personal subjection grounds because it
can be said that the defendant, in such circumstances, should have
reasonably had it in his contemplation that he could be sued there.
It is important to emphasize that the "real and substantial con-
nection test" was merely the means employed by Mr. Justice La Forest
in Morguard to arrive at a result which comported with the overriding
principles of "order and fairness" essential to "ensure security of
transactions with justice" in a modem system of private international
law. Indeed, he expressly stated that he was attempting to fashion "a
more flexible, qualitative and quantitative test"'2 for the correlatives
of jurisdiction and recognition. Most recently, he took the opportunity
to reaffirm flexibility and eschew any "mechanical counting of con-
tacts or connections" in applying the Morguard standard:
In Morguard, a more accommodating approach to recognition and en-
forcement was premised on there being a "real and substantial connec-
tion" to the forum that assumed jurisdiction and gave judgment.
Contrary to the comments of some commentators and lower court
judges, this was not meant to be a rigid test, but was simply intended to
capture the idea that there must be some limits on the claims to jurisdic-
tion .... The exact limits of what constitutes a reasonable assumption of
jurisdiction were not defined, and I add that no test can perhaps ever be
rigidly applied; no court has ever been able to anticipate all of these.
However, though some of these may well require reconsideration in light
of Morguard, the connections relied on under the traditional rules are a
good place to start. More than this was left to depend on the gradual
accumulation of connections defined in accordance with the broad prin-
ciples of order and fairness.'
2 2
In short, post-Morguard caselaw has not clarified which, if either,
of the personal subjection and administration of justice approaches is
the "proper" approach to determine the existence of a "real and sub-
stantial connection." Nor, given Mr. Justice La Forest's most recent
comments, is it likely to. Both approaches to determining its existence
are legitimate, albeit not exclusive, means to the end of ascertaining
whether it was "fair" and "reasonable" for the rendering court to as-
sume jurisdiction over the defendant. If, as is suggested, the search for
the existence of a real and substantial connection is in reality a fair-
ness/reasonableness control on the assumption of jurisdiction and the
* 121 This formulation was adopted from Moran. See Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 276.
122 Hunt, 1 W.W.R. at 155-66.
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discretion not to exercise it, more than one approach may be needed
to provide the flexibility that permits a court to decide in one case that
the defendant's actions and its connection to the forum are sufficient
to constitute a deemed voluntary submission to its exercise of jurisdic-
tion over her while in another case to determine that, all things con-
sidered, it is not fair and reasonable to subject her to the jurisdiction
of the rendering forum. However, as American experience demon-
strates, this flexibility comes at the expense of imprecision. Consider,
for example, the "traditional notions of fairplay and substantial jus-
tice"'12 3 that underlie the United States due process requirement that
the defendant have "minimum contacts" with the rendering forum.
After many decades of judicial experience, the nature of these requi-
site "minimum contacts" are, also, only vaguely defined.'24
V. FAIRNss AND PoLIcY LIMITATiONS
Some of Mr. Justice La Forest's statements in Morguard indicate
that greater caution will have to be exercised in the recognition and
enforcement of international judgments. 25 The real and substantial
connection test for jurisdiction attempts to achieve a fair balance be-
tween the competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants as to where
the litigation should be adjudicated. But, as Professors Coakeley, Fin-
kle and Barrington have noted, the way in which the litigation is adju-
dicated upon must also be fair. 2 6 In addition, considerations of public
policy may weigh against enforcement, notwithstanding the existence
of the requisite nexus and the fairness of the process. 27
123 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945), (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
124 For a complete discussion, see Philip J. Loree Jr., The Recognition and Enforcement of
United States Judgments in the Canadian Common-Law Provinces: The Problem of In Personam
Jurisdiction, BROOL J. INT'L L. 317, 355-359 (1989). The philosophical basis for the minimum
contacts analysis is still unresolved. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL, AmECicaN CoNFucrs OF
LAW 114 & n.13 (1986).
125 Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 270-271. In Moses, 5 W.W.R. at 287, Huddart J. succinctly
asserted, "Whether there was a real and substantial connection between the action and the terri-
tory where the action was brought will be the only question asked if the judgment is Canadian. If
the judgment is not from a Canadian court, the fairness of the process of the foreign court may
be challenged."
126 See Simon Coakley et al., Comment, Morguard Investments Ltd.. Emerging International
Implications, 15 DAL.Ousm L. J. 629, 641 (1992).
127 La Forest, J., for his part, specifically noted that a Canadian court may have to deal with
its own public policy in some instances: Morguard, 76 D.L.R.4th at 279.
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A. Fairness
Canadian courts are unable to make the same assumptions about
procedural and substantive fairness and the quality of justice in the
international context that they are able to make domestically. Post-
Morguard, the issue has received only cursory attention to date be-
cause the international judgments for which recognition was sought
were from the United States and the United Kingdom, jurisdictions
with legal systems similar to Canada's.12 Thus, the fairness of Colo-
rado's process was established because its procedures were "similar to
ours,"'129 the fairness of Massachusetts' process because it was "not so
different" from ours130 and the fairness of practice in the United King-
dom courts because it was "almost identical" with ours.
131 If
Morguard's recognition rule continues to be extended to international
judgments, the day will soon come when Canadian courts will have to
address fairness issues arising out of judgments rendered by courts
with systems of justice substantially different from that prevailing in
the local forum. As these concerns are addressed on an ad hoc basis,
as at present seems likely, different judicial approaches will emerge.
The potential for an initial absence of uniformity, 132 however, should
not deter Canadian common law courts, in the interim, from continu-
ing to recognize international judgments in those "easy" cases where a
real and substantial connection exists and no fairness issue is substan-
tiated. Most United States judgments would, of course, readily con-
tinue to fit into this category as American courts adhere to widely
recognized notions of fairness in procedure and result. Also, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that in cases where a lack of fairness is al-
leged, it is incumbent upon the defendant' to substantiate the
allegation.133
128 Typical are the following comments, "No concern can be expressed about the quality of
[California] justice." Clarke, 84 D.L.R.4th at 252 ; "[T]here is nothing in the Massachusetts law
and practice that is contrary to our perceptions of essential justice ...." Allen, 111 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. at 49.
129 Clancy v. Beach, 92 B.C.L.R.2d 82, 94 (B.C.S.C. 1994). In Minkler and Kirschbaum v.
Sheppard, 60 B.C.L.R.2d 360,364 (B.C.S.C. 1991), Arizona's process for service and for proceed-
ing in default of defence was held to be fair because it was "similar to ours."
130 Allen v. Lynch, 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 43, 49 (P.E.I.S.C. 1993).
131 Fabrelle, 6 C.P.C.3d at 171-172.
132 Ultimately, uniformity could be addressed whether by way of judicial or legislative guide-
lines or via bilateral international agreements.
133 Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf, 88 D.L.R.4th 612, 613 (Ont. C.A. 1992); Allen, 111
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. at 49; But cf Clancy, 92 B.C.L.R.2d 82, which suggests that the judgment credi-
tor has the burden of proof to establish fairness but that this burden can be discharged by show-
ing adjudicative processes similar to those employed locally.
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B. Public Policy
The rules of public policy may afford a good defense against the
enforcement of international judgments in Canada both under the re-
ciprocal enforcement legislation and in actions on the judgment. But,
describing what sort of public policy grounds would lead a Canadian
court to refuse recognition of foreign judgments is no less difficult
than defining what is or should be public policy itself. Because of the
numerous variable and subjective factors involved, it is recognized
that caution must be exercised in refusing recognition on this basis. 34
The common denominator underlying the public policy doctrine has
been variously described as including "essential justice and morality"
and "essential public or moral interests.' 35 Understandably, the diffi-
culty in each case is not with regard to the doctrine but whether the
moral interest is sufficiently important to invoke it.
In several post-Morguard decisions the public policy defense has
been raised, generally without success. In Minkler, it was argued that
since Arizona's matrimonial community property law was so different
from British Columbia law in imposing liability upon a wife for the
debts of her husband, it would be against the public policy of the com-
mon law to enforce the United States judgment. Spencer J. gave short
shrift to the submission, reasoning that mere differences in substantive
law are insufficient grounds upon which to deny recognition. In the
case before him, he found "nothing" about the Arizona community
property regime which was "contrary to [British Columbia] concep-
tions of essential justice and morality."'1 36 It may, however, be a ques-
tion of degree. His finding was no doubt influenced by the fact that
the Arizona regime was "not altogether strange" to British Colum-
bia's laws.' 37 The same type of judicial observation appears to have
134 See, eg., Block Brothers Realty Ltd. v. Mollard, 122 D.L.R.3d 323, 329 (B.C.C.A. 1981).
135 National Surety Co. v. Larsen, 4 D.L.R. 918, 920, 941 (B.C.C.A. 1929).
136 See Minkler, 60 B.C.LR.2d at 365. The U.S. equivalent can be found in Toronto-Domin-
ion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009,1015 (E.D. Ark. 1973), where an Arkansas court enforced a
Canadian judgment notwithstanding that the plaintiff bank's rights were broader under its con-
tract with the debtor than would have been allowed under Arkansas law. The court concluded
that there was nothing in the contract that could be considered shocking, immoral, unconsciona-
ble or unreasonably oppressive in violation of the public policy of the state of Arkansas. See also
Sturm, supra note 23, at 208.
137 Indeed, he noted specifically that there were "echoes" of the Arizona law in British Co-
lumbia's Family Relations Act which gives each spouse a share in family assets. A spouse has,
before a triggering event, an inchoate interest in the other's business ventures where there has
been an indirect contribution but that interest is subject to diminution by debts incurred by the
owing spouse prior to the triggering event. Because a wife, to this extent, would be exposed to
the risk of her husband's debts in British Columbia, the Arizona community property concept
was not "altogether strange" to British Columbia. Minkler, 60 B.C.L.R.2d at 366.
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motivated the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal, in Board-
walk,138 to hold that the enforcement of a gambling debt by a United
States casino was not so contrary to Ontario public policy as to defeat
an enforcement action on the casino's New Jersey judgment. This was
despite the fact that the operations conducted by the New Jersey ca-
sino would have invoked criminal sanction if conducted in Ontario,
139
and despite the fact that Ontario law would have barred recovery of
the gambling debt if it had been incurred in Ontario.140 It was held
that enforcement would not violate "conceptions of essential justice
and morality"'' largely because the federal and provincial govern-
ments actively promoted gambling activities and derived substantial
revenue from them:142
The provincial legislature may bar recovery of the loan, but the statute
doing so can hardly be interpreted as establishing a moral policy when
the same government licenses the opportunity. In my view, activities oc-
curring in an enterprise licensed by the state of New Jersey cannot carry
a different colour of morality. The federal Parliament would be inconsis-
tent in decreeing that what is licensed by the Province of Ontario or
under the auspices of an annual exhibition has moral integrity, while
what is licensed and regulated by New Jersey does not.143
Such cases can be distinguished from those where instinctive moral
repugnance finds confirmation in the criminal law:
[Public policy] must be more than the morality of some persons and
must run through the fabric of society to the extent that it is not conso-
nant with our system of justice and general moral outlook to counte-
nance the conduct, no matter how legal it may have been where it
occurred. 144
138 88 D.L.R.4th at 613.
139 If conducted in Ontario, the business would constitute operating a common gaming house
contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 197,201 (1985) (Can.) (amended).
140 Gaming Act, R.S.O., ch. G.2, §§ 1, 4, 5 (1990). A similar conclusion was reached by the
Quebec Court of Appeal which refused to extend the public policy embodied in Quebec legisla-
tion to prevent enforcement of a gambling debt governed by New Jersey law. See Resorts Int'
89 D.L.R.4th 688. (Que. C.A. 1991).
141 A foreign judgment "should not be declared unenforceable on grounds of public policy
unless its enforcement would violate conceptions of essential justice and morality." Boardwalk,
88 D.L.R.4th at 615.
142 Id. at 623.
143 Id. at 617.
144 The example of a foreign judgment arising out of a contract relating to the corruption of
children was provided by Carthy, J.A., who noted, "[lit is unimaginable to consider an amend-
ment to make [the corruption of children] an offence only if not licensed by a provincial body or
conducted at an annual fair, but that very fact makes the point that the morality of gambling as a
part of our social fibre is very different from other offences in the Criminal Code." Id. at 623.
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Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that the scope of the public
policy defence measured against this definition of essential morality
would be extremely limited in its application to U.S. judgments.
Concern has been expressed by some Canadian commentators
that U.S. damage awards may be too generous in comparison to what
Canadian courts might award in similar circumstances. 45 Clarke ad-
dressed the issue but was a case where an American defendant moved
to Canada after the cause of action arose. The court quite properly
declined to impose upon the plaintiff Canadian standards on quantum
of damages in such circumstances holding that concerns of fairness
militated almost entirely against the defendant. 46 The same reasoning
with respect to the issue of fairness was applied in Stoddard, even
though the defendant was in Canada at all relevant times. The case is
significant because the amount of the damage award exceeded by
many times the limits to such awards in Canada by reason of the pub-
lic policy decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. In holding that
these excessive non-pecuniary damages were not unfair, Errico J. left
open the question as to whether they were contrary to public policy as
that issue was not advanced before him." In Clancy, the issue was
advanced. Smith J., of the British Columbia Supreme Court, held that
public policy would not be violated so long as the remedy granted by
the United States court was "similar in kind" to the remedies which
would be granted locally, even though "the amounts
awarded .... appear immoderate in comparison to what this Court
might award in similar circumstances."
48
Turtle Creek Condominium Association v. Skalbania149 is the lone
post-Morguard decision demonstrating the unusual type of circum-
stances where the public policy defense might succeed in an American
context. The plaintiff brought an action in British Columbia to enforce
a California default judgment. The defendant brought an interim ap-
plication for the discovery of documents. The main issue before the
court was whether discovery should be permitted because the defend-
ant's proposal and discharge under Canada's Bankruptcy and Insol-
vency Act 5 0 raised a potential defense to the action on the California
145 Loree, supra note 124, at 351. See also Shirley Sostre-Oquendo, Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in the Canadian Common Law Provinces, 4 DLT. C.L. REV. 1019,
1026 (1992).
146 84 D.LR.4th at 252.
147 1 W.W.R. at 688 (1994).
148 92 B.C.L.R.2d at 93.
149 83 B.C.L.R.2d 111 (B.C.S.C. 1992).
150 Bankrupcy Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3 (1985) (Can.).
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judgment. Sauders J. allowed discovery on the basis that the case
could fit within the public policy exception to the enforcement of for-
eign judgments. He reasoned that the BIA provisions potentially pro-
tected the defendant from at least a portion of the plaintiff's claim
depending upon the time when the claim was known or should have
been known and the question of whether it was an obligation incurred
before the date of the proposal. If, for example, the United States
judgment creditor's original claim was provable in bankruptcy as be-
ing a liability to which the Canadian defendant was subject at the date
of his proposal or one to which he became subject before his dis-
charge, then s.121 of the Act would extinguish the debt. In these cir-
cumstances, to subsequently permit the recognition and enforcement
of the related judgment would be contrary to the public policy articu-
lated in the legislation. In a similar vein, public policy concerns could
motivate the Attorney General of Canada to prohibit the recognition
and enforcement of a United States money judgment arising out of
anti-trust proceedings.151
On the basis of the foregoing cases, it appears that the public pol-
icy exception, like that of fairness, is capable of providing necessary
limits on Morguard's extension to international judgments generally.
Barring exceptional circumstances, however, these limitations on the
Morguard principle are unlikely to inhibit the trend towards the rec-
ognition of United States judgments once a real and substantial con-
nection has been established.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increase in transnational litigation between Americans and
Canadians has likewise increased the number of judgment creditors
seeking cross-border recognition and enforcement of their judgments.
Until quite recently, United States judgment creditors were at a signif-
icant disadvantage vis-a-vis their Canadian counterparts. American
courts recognized Canadian in personam default judgments even
when jurisdiction was exercised exclusively on the basis of extraterri-
torial service of process, providing the defendant had sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" with the rendering Canadian forum. Canadian courts,
on the other hand, would not recognize a United States judgment un-
less the American court exercised jurisdiction in accordance with in-
flexible nineteenth century common law rules requiring either the
judgment debtor's residence in the rendering state or the service of
151 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29, s.8.
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originating process therein. Providing the judgment debtor did not
otherwise attorn to the jurisdiction of the rendering court, his Cana-
dian assets were not exigible unless the United States plaintiff reliti-
gated successfully in Canada.
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Morguard dramatically changed the traditional rules for the recogni-
tion and enforcement of interprovincial judgments in Canada. An ad-
ditional ground for recognition based upon the existence of a "real
and substantial connection" was established. Morguard further sug-
gested, albeit in obiter dictum, that the common law rules for the en-
forcement of international judgments were likewise ripe for re-
appraisal. Following upon this suggestion, several lower Canadian
courts and one appellate court have extended the reach of the "real
and substantial connection" test to permit the recognition of default
United States judgments. While the trend has not been unanimous, it
is strongly rooted both in principle and practicality. For this reason, it
is likely to continue and, given the comments expressed in two recent
S.C.C. decisions, likely to be definitively sanctioned.
While the common law rules governing the assumption of juris-
diction by a foreign court and the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments evolved discretely, Morguard recognized their
correlative nature and provided the rational justification for their
reunification on the basis of the "real and substantial connection" test.
Insofar as that test is concerned, its parameters are evolving. Cana-
dian decisions to date have applied both personal subjection and ad-
ministration of justice approaches to its determination. What appears
to have emerged is a more flexible approach to jurisdiction based on
order and fairness and the net result should not lack familiarity to
American judgment creditors experienced in "minimum contacts"
analyses.
Regarding present recognition and enforcement prospects for
United States judgments, if jurisdiction was exercised by the rendering
court on grounds traditionally recognized at common law, the U.S.
judgment creditor will generally be able to enforce her judgment in
Canada's common law provinces, whether by registration or action.
Most United States default judgments, on the other hand, will require
Morguard's assistance and, therefore, its continued extension. The
prognosis for this is presently favorable and, in consequence, it is
likely that increasing numbers of defendants with Canadian assets will
be appearing in United States courts to contest both jurisdiction and
the substantive merits of the litigation. This, in turn, will provide even
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greater opportunities for United States judgment creditors to enforce
their judgments in Canada on traditional grounds. However, residual
sour notes remain. Absent legislative change, it is doubtful that the
Morguard principle can be used to expand the traditional grounds for
the recognition of international judgments in New Brunswick and Sas-
katchewan. Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that Morguard
and its judicial aftermath has significantly improved the prospects for
many United States judgment creditors. For them, in the familiar
words of that Gershwin standard, "Things Are Looking Up!"
